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NOTES
ADMINISTERING THE DEATH PENALTY
In Coleman v. Balkcom,1 Justice Rehnquist recently protested
against the "constitutional stalemate" that currently prevents the states
from administering their death penalty statutes.2 Justice Rehnquist
observed that since the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the death penalty in 1976,1 state juries have sentenced hundreds of peo-
ple to death.' Justice Rehnquist noted, however, that only once since
1976 has a state actually executed a person who had vigorously attacked
his sentence on appeal.' Justice Rehnquist offered two reasons to explain
451 U.S. 949, 956 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
451 U.S. at 957 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Coleman, Justice Rehnquist
dissented from the Court's decision to deny certiorari to a capital defendant who had avoid-
ed imposition of the death penalty since 1973 by continuously appealing his conviction and
sentence. Id. The Supreme Court previously had denied certiorari to Coleman on direct ap-
peal from the Georgia Supreme Court. See Coleman v. Georgia, 431 U.S. 909 (1977); text ac-
companying notes 50-60 infra (discussion of direct appeal process). In Coleman, the Court
denied certiorari a second time after Coleman had pursued post-conviction relief in the
Georgia court. 451 U.S. at 957; see text accompanying notes 61-63 infra (discussion of
post-conviction appeal process). Justice Rehnquist stated that by denying certiorari the
Supreme Court permitted Coleman to pursue further appeals in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. 451 U.S. at 957; see text accompanying notes 64-73 infra (discussion of federal
habeas corpus review).
3 451 U.S. at 957 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)); see text accompanying notes 33-37 infra (discussion of Supreme Court's 1976 death
penalty cases).
1 451 U.S. at 958 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Since 1976, the states have added an
average of 120 people each year to the nation's death row population. See Gillers, Deciding
Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gillers]. The death row
population has grown from a low of 65 people in late 1976 to 453 people in October 1978, 691
people in October 1980, and 850 people in September 1981. See Gillers, supra, at 2 n.2; A
New Executioner: The Needle, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 80; Death Row, U.S.A. (June 30,
1980) (unpublished document prepared by N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc.,
10 Columbus Cir., New York, N.Y., 10019) [hereinafter cited as Death Row].
451 U.S. at 958 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The State of Florida executed John
Spenkelink in 1979 after Spenkelink had challenged his sentence on appeal for over six
years. Id. at 951 n.5 (Stevens. J., concurring); see note 74 infra (discussion of Spenkelink
case). The Supreme Court has permitted the execution of two other prisoners since 1976
after both prisoners expressed the desire to die rather than spend their lives in jail. See
Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1307, vacating stay of execution, 444 U.S. 807, 808 (1979)
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (the case of Jesse Bishop); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S.
1012, 1013 (1976) (the case of Gary Gilmore); see generally, Note, The Death Row Right to
Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Right
th Die] (discussion of Bishop and Gilmore cases). The Supreme Court has refused to stay the
execution of one other capital defendant who had indicated a desire to die. See Evans v.
Bennett, 440 U.S. 987, vacating stay of execution, 440 U.S. 1301, 1306-07 (1979). At the last
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the lack of executions since 1976.6 First, he suggested that the Court in
its post-1976 death penalty decisions has surrounded the capital defen-
dant with procedural safeguards not available to other criminal defen-
dants.7 Second, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the present system of
appellate review precludes the states from imposing the death penalty
within a reasonable time after trial.' Concluding that the lengthy delay
between conviction and punishment frustrates the valid deterrent and
retributive purposes of the death penalty,9 Justice Rehnquist proposed
moment, however, the prisoner authorized his attorneys to apply for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently granted the writ. See
Evans v. Britton, 628 F.2d 400, 401 (5th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court recently granted cer-
tiorari to consider the Fifth Circuit's disposition of the case. See Britton v. Evans, 49
U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. May 23, 1981).
6 See 451 U.S. at 957-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' 451 U.S. at 958-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 40-48
infra (discussion of Supreme Court's post-1976 death penalty decisions). Justice Rehnquist
in Coleman suggested that the Supreme Court unwisely has been "tinkering" with the Con-
stitution in the post-1976 death penalty cases and may have sent a message to lower courts
to prevent imposition of the death penalty at all costs 451 U.S. at 959 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist has refused to participate in this "tinkering," having
dissented in all but one case since 1976 where the Court overturned a state prisoner's death
sentence on constitutional grounds. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 475 (1981) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
' 451 U.S. at 957 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 49-74
infra (discussion of present system of appellate review in death penalty cases).
' 451 U.S. at 957-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist in Coleman cited
the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-87 (1976), for the proposition that
the two social purposes for the death penalty are deterrence and retribution. 451 U.S. at
957-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Numerous commentators have debated whether the death
penalty does fulfill deterrent and retributive purposes. See, e.g., W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 83-152 (1979); C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE
AND MISTAKE 23-28 (1974); F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 82-101 (1978);
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment. A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 397 (1975); Passell & Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment-
Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 447 (1977); Gibbs, The Death Penalty, Retribution and
Penal Policy, 69 J. CRyI. L. 291 (1978). Justice Brennan in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
302-05 (1972), also observed that the time between conviction and execution was so great
that the deterrent and retributive effects of the death penalty were minimized. Id Unlike
Justice Rehnquist, however, Justice Brennan concluded that since lengthy appellate review
frustrated the deterrent and retributive purposes of the death penalty, the Court should
declare the death penalty unconstitutional. Id.
The anti-capital punishment attorneys associated with the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc. for years have made it part of their tactics to extend the appellate pro-
cess in capital cases as long as possible. See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 66 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MELTSNER];
Bodine, DAs Fight Delays on Death Row, Nat'l L.J. Dec. 22, 1980, at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter
cited as Bodine]; Note, Furman to Gregg: The Judicial and Legislative History, 22 How.
L.J. 53, 70-71 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Furman to Gregg]. The rationale for using delaying
tactics is that the longer the delay between conviction and execution, the more cogent the
argument becomes that the death penalty serves no useful purpose. See MELTSNER, supra,
at 66; Furman to Gregg, supra, at 70. Stretching out the appellate process also increases the
prospect that federal judges, reviewing the case in federal habeas corpus proceedings many
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as a reform that the Court automatically grant certiorari to capital
defendants petitioning the Court from the states' highest appellate
courts."° Under the proposal, if the Supreme Court affirmed the death
penalty sentence after reviewing the defendant's constitutional claims,
the defendant could not present again these same claims in a federal
court." The state, therefore, could then promptly carry out the execu-
tion. 2
While Justice Rehnquist's arguments are persuasive, his proposal is
not a practical solution to the present system of federal appellate review
in death penalty cases." The Supreme Court does not have the capacity
to grant certiorari and decide every death penalty case coming to it from
the lower courts.14 Justice Rehnquist's proposal does provide, however,
years after the defendant was sentenced to die, will experience revulsion at the prospect of
imposing the sentence at such a late date. Telephone interview with Judge Clement F.
Haynsworth, Jr., Chief Judge of the Fourth ' Circuit Court of Appeals (Sept. 17, 1981)
(transcript on rile in law review office). In addition, extending the appellate process insures
that the number of people on death row continues to grow. See note 4 supra. The tactical
importance of increasing the death row population is that the courts will be less likely to
permit the first executions on the belief that their decisions would create the momentum for
the immediate executions of hundreds of death row prisoners. See Furman to Gregg, supra,
at 71. Some of the anti-capital punishment attorneys, however, have predicted recently that
since many capital defendants are about to exhaust their appeal options, the states will ex-
ecute hundreds in 1982, barring a major Supreme Court decision preventing the executions.
See Marcus, Death Wait Shortens, Nat'l L.J., July 14, 1980, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Marcus]. "
"*451 U.S. at 963-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist in Coleman is
somewhat unclear whether he is proposing that the Supreme Court automatically grant cer-
tiorari to all capital defendants on appeal from the states' highest courts or only to those
capital defendants who present claims that on their face have little merit. In attacking the
practicality of Justice Rehnquist's proposal, Justice Stevens reads the proposal to apply to
all capital defendants. See id. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring). The general tone of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, if not the precise language of his proposal, supports Justice Stevens' in-
terpretation. See id. at 956-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" 451 U.S. at 963-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist in Coleman noted
that if the Supreme Court heard all of the prisoner's claims and denied relief, § 2244(c) of Ti-
tle 28 United States Code would preclude further federal review of those claims. 451
U.S. at 963 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1976), see text accompany-
ing notes 64-73 infra (discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and other provisions of federal habeas
corpus).
" 451 U.S. at 964 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist in Coleman did
acknowledge that the capital defendant could still pursue any form of state relief available
to him, such as executive clemency. 1d; see text accompanying nQtes 51-58, 61-62 infra
(discussion of state appeal options).
" See 451 U.S. at 949-53 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" See 451 U.S. at 949-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Coleman Justice Stevens
observed that death row prisoners had filed over 90 certiorari petitions in the previous 10
month period. Id. He predicted that the Court would have to devote over half of its docket
to hear a substantial number of these cases. Id Justice Stevens concluded that such an
allocation of the Court's resources would be improper. Id. at 950. A review of past
Supreme Court practice supports Justice Stevens' position. Since 1925, the Court con-
sistently has issued opinions in about 150 cases a year, even though the number of petitions
1982]
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the basis for an alternative reform. In recent years, several commen-
tators have called for the creation of a new national court of appeals. 5 A
national appeals court could provide the prompt and thorough federal
review of a capital defendant's constitutional claims that Justice Rehn-
quist advocates. The proposed court could, therefore, resolve the cur-
rent stalemate in death penalty administration. 7
In Coleman, both Justice Rehnquist 8 and Justice Stevens 9 observed
that the Supreme Court's numerous decisions in death penalty cases
since 1972 were partly responsible for the lack of executions during this
time period. Prior to 1972, several hundred years of legal tradition,20 the
Constitution,2 numerous Supreme Court decisions,2 and the frequency
for review has increased from 1000 in 1925 to more than 4000 in 1973. See Griswold, Ration-
ing Justice- The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL
L. REV. 335, 339 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Griswold]. In 1976, the Court issued opinions in
142 cases, 23 of which involved constitutional challenges by state prisoners. See C.
WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 574 n.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITEBREAD]. Only
five of these 23 cases involved the death penalty. See text accompanying notes 33-37 infra
(discussion of the 1976 death penalty cases). The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari
and issued an opinion in more than three death penalty cases in any year since 1976. See
note 40 infra. In 1980, for example, of the more than 90 certiorari petitions before the Court
from capital defendants, the Court issued opinions in only three cases. See Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980); Note, Eighth Amendment- The Death Penalty, 71 J. CRIM. L. 538 (1980).
" See text accompanying notes 81-126 infra.
451 U.S. 956-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11 See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
19 451 U.S. at 950-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens in Coleman suggested
that the Supreme Court confronted a number of important constitutional issues during the
1970s in death penalty jurisprudence that took considerable time to resolve. Id. Justice
Stevens predicted that since the Court had now settled many.of the outstanding issues, the
states should be able to carry out the death penalty sentence without as much delay in the
future. Id. But see text accompanying note 29 infra (Supreme Court has not provided
states clear guidelines on what Constitution requires in death penalty cases).
22 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334-41 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). In
1776, every American colony punished certain crimes by death. Id. at 335-37. Not until 1852
did Rhode Island become the first state to abolish the death penalty. See Murchison,
Toward A Perspective on the Death Penalty Cases, 27 EMORY L.J. 469, 473 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Murchison].
21 See U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1. Both the fifth and fourteenth amendments
appear to recognize capital punishment as one punishment available to the states and
federal government. The fifth amendment reads in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of Life or Limb ... nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... (emphasis
added)
The fourteenth amendment reads in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.... (emphasis added)
I See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In
Gregg and Furman, the Supreme Court reviewed the pre-1972 Supreme Court cases rele-
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with which the states and the federal government executed people" pro-
vided implicit support for the proposition that the death penalty was a
constitutional punishment. In 1972, however, the Supreme Court in Fur-
vant to the issue of capital punishment. The relevant pre-1972 cases can be divided into four
categories. The first category consists of death penalty cases where the defendant attacked
the method of execution as an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g.,
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (mechanical failure does not
preclude rescheduling of execution); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1890) (death by
electrocution does not violate fourteenth amendment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
134-35 (1879) (death -by firing squad does not violate eighth amendment): The second
category includes those cases where the Supreme Court created special procedural protec-
tions for the capital defendant. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1968)
(state cannot exclude potential jurors with scruples against death penalty who are willing to
consider all possible penalties); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (capital defendant
has a constitutional right to counsel). The third category includes those non-death penalty
cases involving the eighth amendment where the Supreme Court gave the "cruel and
unusual" clause a dynamic and evolving rather than fixed and unchanging meaning and ap-
plied the amendment to the states. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies to states); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,100-01 (1958) (eighth amendment draws its meaning from evolving stand-
ards of decency that mark progress of maturing society); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 378 (1910) (eighth amendment requires punishment to be proportionate to crime and ap-
propriate punishment is determined by public opinion enlightened by humane justice). The
fourth category includes those cases that set the stage for the constitutional attack on the
death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See McGautha v. California,, 402
U.S. 183 (1971); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963). In McGautha, the Court held that
the fourteenth amendment does not require the states to provide the sentencing judge or
jury specific standards to guide sentencing discretion in capital cases. 402 U.S. at 207. One
year later in Furman, the Court would hold that the eighth amendment does require the
states to provide the sentencing authority specific guidelines. 408 U.S. at 239-40; see text ac-
companying notes 24-29 infira (discussion of Furman decision). In Rudolph, Justice Goldberg
dissented from the denial of certiorari in a case where the defendant faced death for the
crime of rape. 375 U.S. at 889 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg argued that the
Court should consider the issue of whether death was an appropriate punishment for rape.
Id. at 890. Justice Goldberg questioned whether under current standards of decency the
penalty of death may be disproportionate to the crime of rape and may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 891. The effect of Justice Goldberg's dissent was to stimulate for
the first time petitions to the Supreme Court directly attacking the constitutionality of the
death penalty. See Goldberg, Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 355,
365 (1973); Furman to Gregg, supra note 9, at 67 n.41. The Supreme Court did not resolve
the issues raised by Justice Goldberg until 1977, when the Court held that the death penalty
was a cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of rape. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977).
1 See Murchison, supra note 20, at 552 n.478. In the four decades between 1930 and
1969, the states and the federal government executed 3859 persons. Id. The frequency of ex-
ecution within each decade dropped appreciably over the forty year period:





Id. The downward trend continued in the 1970-1979 decade with the states executing only
three people. See note 5 supra.
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man v. Georgia24 explicitly considered whether the death penalty
violated the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment.25 The Furman Court did not reach.a majority on the issue of
whether the death penalty was an unconstitutional punishment per se.
Five justices, however, agreed that the eighth amendment prohibited
death penalty statutes that granted the sentencing authority unfettered
discretion in deciding whether to impose life imprisonment or death
upon conviction of a capital crime.26 The Furman decision invalidated all
existing death penalty statutes in the nation" and reversed the death
penalty sentences of over 600 death row inmates.' Given the absence of
a common rationale in the Furman decision, however, the longer term ef-
fect of Furman was to begin what one commentator has called a "decade
of disarray" in death penalty jurisprudence.9
2 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
408 U.S. at 239. In Furman, a Georgia jury sentenced the defendant to death after
finding him guilty of murder. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
2 408 U.S. at 239. Furman included not only a per curiam opinion invalidating
Georgia's death penalty statute, in which five justices joined, but also included individual
opinions by all nine justices. Id. at 240. Four of the justices dissented in Furman, all agree-
ing that the death penalty was constitutional and that the Court should defer to the judg-
ment of state legislatures regarding the sentencing procedures that judges and juries
should follow in capital cases. See id. at 375-405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405-14
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Two of the concurring justices concluded that the death penalty was a per se violation
of the cruel and unusual clause of the eighth amendment. See id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring). The remaining three concurring justices
refused to hold that the death penalty was always cruel and unusual punishment, but did
hold that the broad sentencing discretion permitted the jury in Furman did violate the
eighth amendment. Justice Douglas concluded that discretionary death penalty statutes
were unconstitutional because they allowed the sentencing authority to impose the death
penalty in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart refused to decide whether the death penalty was per se unconstitutional,
although he conceded that the argument was persuasive. Id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurr-
ing). Instead, Justice Stewart concluded that discretionary sentencing statutes permitted
random and capricious imposition of the death penalty. Id. Justice White noted that under
existing death penalty laws there was no meaningful way to distinguish those few cases in
which trial courts imposed the death penalty from the many cases where trial courts did
not. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice White concluded that since under existing cir-
cumstances the death penalty was so infrequently and arbitrarily imposed, the punishment
no longer fulfilled a valid state purpose. Id. at 312-13.
' See 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting);
Gillers, supra note 4, at 8 n.28; Furman to Gregg, supra note 9, at 84 n.94.
2 See Gillers, supra note 4, at 8 n.28; Furman to Gregg, supra note 9, at 84 n.94. The
states did not resentence to death any of the more than 600 prisoners convicted under pre-
Furman death penalty statutes. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 309 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
2 Radin, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process
for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1183-84 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Radin]. Support for
Radin's proposition that the Supreme Court's Furman decision ushered in a "decade of
disarray" in death penalty jurisprudence is abundant. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
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Subsequent to the Furman decision, many states passed new death
penalty statutes designed to eliminate arbitrary sentencing. 0 Some
states interpreted Furman to require the adoption of mandatory death
penalty statutes for particular crimes. 1 Other states interpreted Fur-
man to require the adoption of statutes that guided, but did not
eliminate, the sentencer's discretion.2 In 1976, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the appeals of five capital defendants who challenged both the
constitutionality of capital punishment and the constitutionality of their
state's post-Furman death penalty statute." In the principal case of
Gregg v. Georgia,' a majority of the justices agreed that the death
penalty is a constitutional punishment and that Georgia's guided discre-
tion death penalty statute did not violate the eighth amendment's pro-
hibition against arbitrary and capricious sentencing. 5 The same majority
586, 599, 602 (1978) (per Burger, C.J.) (Furman and subsequent death penalty cases have
sent states signals not easy to decipher); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 191, 599 P.2d
587, 616, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 285 (1979) (Mosk, J., concurring) (Supreme Court has not given
states consistent and workable guidance on what Constitution requires in death penalty
cases); Combs, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment. Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and
Judicial Control, 7 S. U. L. REV. 1, 13-30 (1980); Gillers, supra note 4, at 8; .Comment, New.
Direction for Capital Sentencing or an About-Face for the Supreme Court?-Lockett v.
Ohio, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 336 (1979).
31 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976). By 1976, 35 states and the federal
government had enacted new death penalty statutes for certain crimes. Id. at 179 & n.23.
See Furman to Gregg, supra note 9, at 84-96 (discussion of action taken by states subse-
quent to Furman).
" See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). After Furman, North Carolina enacted a new mandatory
death penalty law whereby, once a jury found a capital defendant guilty of first degree
murder or rape, the court was required to impose the death penalty automatically. Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1976). In addition to North Carolina, at least 19 other
states interpreted Furman to require mandatory sentencing. See Furman to Gregg, supra
note 9, at 89-90.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-67 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 248-50 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269-74 (1976). After Furman, Georgia
enacted a new guided discretion death penalty law whereby, after the trier of fact returned
a guilty verdict to one of six capital crimes, the court would schedule a separate sentencing
hearing. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163 (1976). At the hearing, the trier of fact must
find beyond a reasonable doubt one of ten statutory aggravating circumstances present
before it can sentence the defendant to death. Id. at 164-65. Even if the sentencing authority
finds beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of one or more statutory aggravating circum-
stances, the sentencing authority .is still free, after considering any mitigating circum-
stances the defendant may introduce at the hearing, to exercise its discretion and sentence
the defendant to life imprisonment. Id. at 166. In addition to Georgia, at least nine other
states interpreted Furman to require guided discretion sentencing. See Furman to Gregg,
supra note 9, at 86-88.
I See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.-242, 247
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,'282
(1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 327 (1976).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
= See 428 U.S. at 158-207 (Stewart, J. with Powell and Stevens, JJ., plurality); id. at
207-26 (White, J., concurring, with Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J., joining); id. at 227
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of justices upheld the guided discretion death penalty statutes that
Texas and Florida had adopted subsequent to Furman.s6 A different ma-
jority of justices, however, held that the mandatory death penalty
statutes enacted by North Carolina and Louisiana violated the eighth
amendment."
(Blackmun, J., concurring). As in Furman, see note 26 supra, the Gregg Court split into three
factions. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on the grounds that the death penalty
was always cruel and unusual punishment and violated the eighth amendment. See 428 U.S.
at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The plurality of Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens first considered whether the death penalty was unconstitu-
tional per se. See id. at 168 (Stewart, J. with Powell and Stevens, JJ., plurality). The plural-
ity reviewed the precedents in eighth amendment cases and extracted two standards to
guide the Court in evaluating the constitutionality of the death penalty. Id. at 169-73. First,
the plurality noted that the eighth amendment drew its meaning from the "evolving stand-
ards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Second, the plurality noted that central to the eighth amend-
ment was the core concept of "the dignity of man" which prohibited excessive punishment.
428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). The plurality concluded that,
since 35 states had enacted new death penalty statutes in the wake of Furman, the death
penalty did not violate contemporary standards of decency. 428 U.S. at 180-81. The plurality
also noted that since the death penalty served the useful social purposes of deterrence and
retribution, the punishment was not excessive when imposed on people who had committed
extremely serious crimes such as murder. Id. at 187; see note 9 infra (discussion of social
purposes of death penalty). The plurality then turned to the issue of whether Georgia's
death penalty statute was constitutional. See 428 U.S. at 188. Noting that death was dif-
ferent from other kinds of punishment, the plurality stated that a constitutional sentencing
procedure must minimize the risk that a sentencing authority will impose death in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner. Id. Although the plurality refused to specify what is required
constitutionally in a death penalty statute, the plurality did conclude that Georgia's statute
was constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 195. The plurality noted with approval that Georgia's
statute required a separate proceeding for sentencing, provided objective standards for the
sentencing authority to follow in exercising its discretion, allowed the defendant to intro-
duce and the sentencing authority to consider all mitigating evidence, and provided for
automatic appellate review by the Georgia Supreme Court. Id. at 196-207.
In Gregg, a third faction comprised of Justices White, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the decision to uphold the constitutionality of Georgia's death
penalty statute. See id. at 207 (White, J., concurring, with Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
joining); id. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice White
reviewed the Georgia death penalty statute and concluded that the statute adequately
guided jury discretion and would prevent the death penalty from being imposed in an ar-
bitrary and discriminatory fashion. Id. at 222-23 (White, J., concurring, with Burger, C.J. and
Rehnquist, J., joining). Justice Blackmun concurred on the basis of his dissenting opinion in
Furman. Id. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see note 26 supra (basis of Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Furman).
" See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 244, 260-61 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
264, 277-79 (1976); Murchison, supra note 20, at 499-502 (discussion of Proffitt and Jurek
decisions).
I See Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the decision to
strike down the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes based on their opinions in Gregg.
See Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); id.
at 336-37 (Marshall, J., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305-06 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring); note 35 supra (discussion of
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Since 1976, thirty-five other states have enacted death penalty
statutes similar to the Georgia, Florida, or Texas statute." Under these
statutes, state courts have sentenced hundreds of people to death. 9 The
Supreme Court, however, in thirteen of fourteen post-1976 death penalty
decisions has imposed further constitutional requirements on the states
in death penalty cases."0 Although the Court has not yet provided the
Justices Brennan's and Marshall's Gregg opinions). The Gregg plurality of Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens also drafted a joint opinion striking down the North Carolina and Loui-
siana statutes. See Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 327 (1976) (Stewart, J.
with Powell and Stevens, JJ., plurality); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,283 (1976)
(Stewart, J. with Powell and Stevens, JJ., plurality).
In Woodson, the plurality of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens gave three reasons
for invalidating North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute. The plurality noted that,
under contemporary standards of decency, the old common law practice of imposing death
upon every person convicted of a capital crime was constitutionally intolerable. 428 U.S. at
301. Second, the plurality recognized that'mandatory statutes encouraged juries to find the
defendant not guilty when the death penalty is the only punishment for the crime. Id. at
303. Third, the plurality held that since death is qualitatively different from other
punishments, the eighth amendment requires that the sentencing authority hear any
mitigating evidence the defendant can present on his character, record, or the particular cir-
cumstances surrounding the crime. Id. at 303-05. The plurality also gave these reasons for
invalidating Louisiana's mandatory death penalty statute. See Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Loui-
siana, 428 U.S. 325, 331-36 (1976). The dissenters in Woodson and Roberts (Stanislaus) re-
jected the plurality's argument that mandatory death penalty statutes for certain serious
crimes violated the Constitution. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 306-07 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisi-
ana, 428 U.S. 325, 337-39 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
The effect of the Woodson and Roberts (Stanislaus) decisions was to invalidate the
death penalty statutes in 21 states and to reduce to life imprisonment the sentences of 395
of the 460 people then on death row. See Death Row, supra note 4; Gillers, supra note 4, at 3
n.6.
See Hertz and Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death, Lockett v. Ohio and
the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 317, 327 n.52 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hertz]; Death Row, supra note 4; Gillers,
supra note 4, at 101-19 (detailed analysis of current death penalty statutes of 35 states).
See text accompanying note 4 supra.
40 See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (state violates double jeopardy
clause if it seeks death penalty upon retrial after jury in first trial selected
life sentence option at sentence hearing); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473-74 (1981) (state
violates fifth and sixth amendments if prosecutor introduces results of pretrial psychiatric
examination at sentence hearing and neither Miranda warnings were given defendant nor
notice given defense counsel prior to examination); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 50-51 (1980)
(state violates sixth amendment if it excludes from jury prospective jurors who admit that
their deliberations on issue of guilt or innocence will be affected by their knowledge that
upon conviction court must sentence defendant to death or life imprisonment); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (state violates eighth amendment when it prohibits jury
from considering a guilty verdict for lesser noncapital offense when evidence so warrants);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (state violates eighth amendment when its
death penalty statute does not rationally distinguish between murder cases where death
penalty is imposed and murder cases where death penalty is not imposed); Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (state violates fourteenth amendment if it applies hearsay
evidence rule to sentencing hearing and precludes defendant from introducing mitigating
evidence); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 15-17 (1978) (state violates fourteenth amend-
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states clear constitutional guidelines to follow in enacting and imple-
menting death penalty statutes,4 the Court has emphasized two prin-
ciples in overturning death penalty sentences.4" First, the Court has
adopted a proportionality rule that requires the states to reserve the
death penalty for the most serious of crimes. 3 Second, the Court has
stated that death is constitutionally different from other types of punish-
ment." Consequently, the states may impose the punishment only after
ment if trial court imposes death penalty based on imprecise jury finding at sentence hear-
ing); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (state violates eighth amendment if it prevents
defendant from introducing mitigating evidence during sentencing hearing); Bell v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 637, 642 (1978) (same holding as Lockett); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(state violates eighth amendment if it imposes death penalty on person guilty of rape);
Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637-38 (1977) (state violates eighth amendment if
it requires death penalty in all cases where person has killed policeman); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 358-62 (1977) (state violates fourteenth amendment if it imposes death penalty
on defendant who was not allowed to deny or explain presentence report); Davis v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 122, 123 (1977) (state violates sixth amendment if it improperly excludes prospec-
tive jurors in a death penalty case). But see Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 284 (1977)
(state does not violate ex post facto clause if it convicts and sentences defendant under
death penalty statute that state amended after crime occurred but before trial began).
" See text accompanying note 29 supra.
"See Hancock, The Perils of Calibrating the Death Penalty through Special Defini-
tions of Murder, 53 TUL. L. REv. 828, 836 (1979); Murchison, supra note 20, at 546.
" See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (Stewart, J. with Powell and Stevens,
JJ., plurality). In Gregg, the plurality of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens held that the
death penalty is a constitutionally proportionate punishment for the crime of intentional
murder. Id. at 187. The plurality refused to consider whether the death penalty is a con-
stitutionally permissible punishment for crimes that do not result in the intentional murder
of another human being. Id. at 187 n.35. The Supreme Court subsequent to Gregg, however,
has held that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape
under the eighth amendment. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-600 (1977). In Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), Justice White proposed that the death penalty is a dispropor-
tionate punishment for unintentional murder. Id. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The plurality opinion in Lockett, however, overturned the death penalty
sentence on other grounds and refused to address the proportionality issue. See 438 U.S. at
609 n.16 (per Burger, C.J. with Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joining). The Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari to a capital defendant who is attacking his sentence on the
ground that it is a disproportionate punishment under the eighth amendment for the crime
of felony murder. See Enmund v. Florida, 50 U.S.L.W. 3300 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1981). The defen-
dant in Enmund was the aider and abettor in a robbery that culminated in the murders of
the robbery victims. Id. at 3330. The defendant did not actually kill anyone nor was he pre-
sent at the scene of the murders. Id.
" See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976), where Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens wrote in a joint opinion:
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that
qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliabil-
ity in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case.
See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (significant constitutional difference exists
between death and lesser punishments); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (same);
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providing the capital defendant what amounts to "super due process"
protection during the trial proceedings. 5 The Supreme Court's post-1976
decisions not only have vacated the sentences of over 100 death row
prisoners,' but also have increased the number of constitutional objec-
tions a capital defendant may raise on appeal.' As a result, the states
have been unable to administer their death penalty statutes in a timely
fashion."
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (five members of Court now agree that deathis
constitutionally different penalty than any other penalty).
," See Radin, supra note 29, at 1143. The origins of "super due process" are found in
the 1976 death penalty cases where the plurality of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
upheld or struck down death penalty statutes according to whether the sentencing proce-
dures minimized the prospect of arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.
See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra. Of the thirteen post-1976 death penalty cases in
which the Court has vacated or reversed the death sentence, twelve of those cases involved
state procedures the Court found unconstitutional. See note 40 supra (cast list). The only
case in which procedural considerations played no role was the proportionality case, Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), where the Supreme Court held that the death penalty was
an unconstitutional punishment for the crime of rape. Id. at 592-600. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978), Chief Justice Burger became the fourth Justice to adopt the eighth
amendment "super due process" rationale. Id. at 589. Chief Justice Burger stated in his opi-
nion that, under the eighth amendment, the state must allow the capital defendant to intro-
duce at the sentencing hearing any mitigating evidence regarding his character, record, or
the surrounding circumstances of the offense which might serve as the basis for a sentence
less than death. Id, at 604-05. Chief Justice Burger justified this rule, which would not apply in
non-capital cases, as follows:
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different
from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized
decision is essential in capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in a
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far
more important than in noncapital cases.
Id. at 605 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Lockett, did observe that a
majority of the Court had not yet endorsed the notion that the eighth amendment required
more stringent procedural protections in capital cases. Id. at 632 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackman invalidated Justice Rehnquist's observation two years later when he
became the fifth member of the Court to join an opinion reversing a death penalty sentence
on the ground that the state followed procedures that violated the defendant's eighth
amendment rights. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-33 (1980). Recently, Justice
Rehnquist noted that the effect of the Court's decisions since 1976 has been to surround the
capital defendant with procedural safeguards unheard of in cases involving lesser sentences.
See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 960 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)z Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
" See Death Row, supra note 4. The Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978), alone vacated the sentences of 101 death row inmates. See Death Row,
supra note 4. In most cases, when the Supreme Court has vacated a death penalty sentence
because the sentencing procedures were unconstitutional, the state courts have resentenced
the defendant to life imprisonment. See Hertz, supra note 38, 329-32. Some courts, however,
have resentenced the defendant to death under corrected procedures. Id.
' See Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, 14 CRIm. L. BULL. 69, 73-76 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Nakell]; Marcus, supra note 9, at 9; note 40 supra (post-1976 Supreme
Court decisions).
s See text accompanying notes 1-8 supra.
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In addition to the delaying effect of recent Supreme Court decisions,
the pattern of appellate review in death penalty cases contributes to fur-
ther delay. The prospect of immediate execution motivates the capital
defendant, more so than other criminal defendants, to pursue fully all
avenues of appellate review open to him.49 The capital defendant normally
pursues a direct appeal, a state post-conviction appeal, and a federal
habeas corpus review."0 The capital defendant also may seek executive
clemency review from the state in which he was convicted.61 In addition,
when timing problems occur in the appeal process and execution is im-
pending, the capital defendant will seek a stay of execution from a state
or federal court.2
" See Nakell, supra note 47, at 75. The fearful prospect of execution is not the only
reason a capital defendant vigorously appeals his conviction and sentence. Most capital
defendants believe that they will inevitably avoid execution if they pursue their appeal
vigorously. See Lewis, Killing the Killers: A Post-Furman Profile of Florida's Condemned,
25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 200, 217-18 (1979). One commentator found that 56 of the 68 death
row inmates he surveyed believed the courts or the state clemency authority would reduce
their death sentence to a lesser punishment or overturn their conviction. Id. In a few cases
since 1976, the capital defendant has expressed a desire to die rather than live an uncertain
existence on death row. In these cases, the defendant's counsel, a close relative, or other in-
terested party has sought appellate review on the defendant's behalf and in opposition to
his wishes. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1307, vacating stay of execution, 444 U.S.
807, 808 (1979) (counsel filed habeas corpus petition and obtained temporary stay of execu-
tion over prisoner's objections); Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 987, vacating stay of execution,
440 U.S. 1301, 1306-07 (1979) (prisoner's mother filed "next friend" petition for habeas cor-
pus and obtained stay of execution); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (prisoner's
mother and Latter-Day Saints Freedom Foundation sought stay of execution); Potts v. Zant,
638 F.2d 727, 730-37 (5th Cir. 1981) (counsel filed habeas corpus petition, obtained stay of ex-
ecution, and may have instigated clemency hearing despite prisoner's objections); Right to
Die, supra note 5, at 583-89 (discussion of third party efforts to prevent capital defendants'
imminent execution).
' See text accompanying notes 53-74 infra. See generally Coleman v. Balkcom, 451
U.S. 949, 956-57 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M.
ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 59 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CARRINGTON]; Haynsworth,
Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 597, 602 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Handling Criminal Cases]; Robinson, Proposal and
Analysis of a Unitary System for Review of Criminal Judgments, 54 B.U.L. REV. 485 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Robinson]; Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal
Questions: The Need for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 961 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Stolz].
51 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 & n.50 (1976). In Gregg, the Supreme Court
held that the granting of executive clemency to a death row inmate was an act of indivi-
dualized mercy and did not violate the Constitution. Id. All fifty states in their constitutions
give the executive branch the power to grant clemency to capital defendants. See S. STAF-
FORD, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE, AND STRUCTURE XVI, 1 (1977). See gene-
rally Lavinsky, Executive Clemency: Study of a Decisional Problem Arising in the Ter-
minal Stages of the Criminal Process, 42 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (1965) (history of doctrine of
executive clemency).
" See Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 493 (4th Cir. 1980). In Shaw, a federal circuit
judge granted a stay of execution to a, prisoner facing execution the following day. Id. at
493. The judge noted that under South Carolina law the state supreme court must schedule
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The capital defendant begins the direct appeal process immediately
after the trial court returns a guilty verdict and a sentence of death. The
defendant may file a motion for a new trial based on alleged defects in
the original trial proceedings, but failure to file such a post-trial motion
does not affect the capital defendant's right to appeal.' The trial court
usually denies this new trial motion." In sixteen states, the death penalty
statute mandates that once the trial court resolves any post-trial mo-
tions before it, the state supreme court is to review the case automatical-
ly.' In other states, the appeal is discretionary and the capital defendant
must take the initiative to file the appeal.' Once the case is before the
state supreme court, the court reviews the capital defendant's claim that
the state has violated his state or federal rights.' The court usually finds
no violations and affirms both the conviction and death sentence. 8 At
this point, the capital defendant can seek federal review of his federal
claims in the United States Supreme Court by filing a petition for the
writ of certiorari. 9 In most capital cases, the Supreme Court denies the
petition.6
the execution of a capital defendant to take place four weeks after a denial of certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 489. The judge granted the stay in part because he
considered the four week statutory time frame too restrictive of the prisoner's right to pur-
sue his other appeal options. Id. at 492 n.2. The authority to grant stays of execution is
given to federal judges in § 2251 of Title 28 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 2251
(1976).
See National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,
COURTS 117 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COURTS]; Corbett, Post-trial Motions and Appeals, 14
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 997, 1000-01 (1978) (North Carolina's post-trial motion procedures); A
Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual, 9 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 3,235 (1977) (New York's post-
trial motion procedures).
" See COURTS, supra note 53, at 117; Nejelski and Emory, Unified Appeal in State
Criminal Cases, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 484,495-96 (1976).
m See Right to Die, supra note 5, at 578 & n.22. The 16 states requiring automatic ap-
pellate review of death penalty cases are.Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
0 See Right to Die, supra note 5, at 579. In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the
Supreme Court upheld a death penalty statute that provided for expedited appellate review
rather than automatic appellate review. Id. at 269-70.
11 See Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J. 97, 106-59
(1979).
SId. Dix found in a study of state appellate review of death penalty cases in Georgia,
Florida, and Texas that the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the sentence of death in 75%
of the cases it reviewed between 1974 and 1979, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
sentence in 50% of the cases, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in 67%
of the cases. Id. at 111, 125, 145.
", Section 1257(3) of Title 28 of the United States Code gives the Supreme Court
discretionary jurisdiction by way of the writ of certiorari to hear federal or constitutional
law challenges to final judgements of the highest court in a given state. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)
(1976).
I See note 14 %upra (discussion of Supreme Court's treatment of certiorari petitions
from capital defendants).
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Once the capital defendant has exhausted his direct appeal, he
typically will begin the post-conviction appeal sequence. The capital
defendant can return to the state court in which he was convicted and
sentenced and in post-conviction proceedings present any state or
federal claims he did not raise on direct appeal." If the state court denies
him relief, the capital defendant can appeal the decision to the state
supreme court.2 If the state supreme court also denies relief, the capital
defendant may appeal the federal claims raised in the post-conviction
proceedings to the United States Supreme Court by filing his second
petition for the writ of certiorari. 3
Assuming a second denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court,
the capital defendant begins the third, and final, appeal seq-
uence by filing for the writ of habeas corpus64 in a federal district
61 See generally State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 147 (1970) [hereinafter cited as State Post-Conviction Remedies]. In 36
states, the prisoner can appeal under a post-conviction procedure act that is very similar to
the federal habeas corpus provisions of § 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code. 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). See R. POPPER, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES 44, 50 (1978). In the remain-
ing states, the prisoner will seek the common law writ of habeas corpus or coram nobis. Id.
See also Note, Relieving the Habeas Corpus Burden. A Jurisdictional Remedy, 63 IOWA L.
REv. 392, 420 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Relieving Habeas Corpus]. Work done by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the 1950s and 1960s provided
the model for the states' post-conviction laws. See UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE
ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1966 rev. ed.).
2 See State Post-Conviction Remedies, supra note 61, at 183-233 (discussion of the ap-
peal process in post-conviction proceedings).
" See CARRINGTON, supra note 50, at 58-59.
See Handling Criminal Cases, supra note 50, at 598-99. The writ of habeas corpus
originated in England as a common law remedy for illegal imprisonment. Id. The framers of
the Constitution included the writ of habeas corpus in the Constitution and specified that
Congress could not suspend the writ except when public safety required. U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 9, cl. 2. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave federal courts the power to grant the
writ when the federal government restrains a person's liberty in violation of the Constitu-
tion, federal treaty, or law. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82. The grant of
habeas corpus jurisdiction to federal courts to hear cases involving federal prisoners is
presently located in § 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). In
1867, Congress extended the writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners imprisoned by the
state in violation of the Constitution, federal treaty, or law. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1,
14 Stat. 385. The grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction to federal courts to hear cases involv-
ing state prisoners is presently located in § 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code. 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Since Congress originally did no more than make the writ available, the
Supreme Court has had the task of defining over the last 200 years the meaning and scope
of the writ. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 14, at 576.
Originally, the Supreme Court limited the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners who
claimed the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-04 (1830); In re Moran, 203 U.S. 96, 105 (1906); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309, 326 (1915). See also Note, Guilt, Innocence, and Federalism in Habeas Corpus, 65
CORNELL L. REv. 1123, 1124 (1980). In Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), however, the
Court held that habeas corpus was available, even when the trial court had exercised valid
jurisdiction, if the state did not provide the defendant adequate means to raise his constitu-
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court. 5 The district court will review the capital defendant's claims if
the court determines that the capital defendant is in state custody pur-
suant to a judgment by a state court, 6 has exhausted his state
remedies, 1 is not presenting claims that he waived at an earlier stage
tional claims. Id. at 105. The Supreme Court expanded the writ further in Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953). In Brown, the Court held that a prisoner may raise a constitutional
claim in federal habeas corpus proceedings after he had presented the claim in the state
trial and appellate courts, provided that the defendant had earlier exhausted all his state
remedies. Id. at 486-88. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Warren Court expanded the
writ beyond Brown by holding that the defendant need only exhaust the state remedies still
available to him before seeking habeas corpus review. Id. at 435. The Court added in Fay,
however, that a federal judge may deny habeas corpus relief if the defendant deliberately
by-passed a state remedy that is now no longer available to him. Id. at 438-39.
Commentators have offered two reasons to explain why the Warren Court expanded
the scope of federal habeas corpus. See Handling Criminal Cases, supra note 50, at 601;
WHITEBREAD, supra note 14, at 574. Some commentators suggest that the Warren Court,
prevented by its heavy caseload from giving attention to all the legitimate constitutional
questions state prisoners presented in certiorari petitions, expanded the writ of habeas cor-
pus to insure adequate federal review. See Handling Criminal Cases, supra note 50, at 601;
Stolz, supra note 50, at 960-61. One commentator has noted that the Warren Court, having
greatly expanded the federal constitutional rights of the criminal defendant in the 1960s and
not trusting the state courts to enforce these rights, expanded habeas corpus review to pro-
tect the state prisoner's constitutional claims. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 574. As a
result of the Warren Court's decisions in the area of habeas corpus and criminal procedure,
the state criminal defendant could cast almost all his substantive or procedural objections in
federal constitutional terms and obtain federal review of his case. See CARRINGTON, supra
note 50, at 59; CouRTs, supra note 53, at 130. Beginning in 1975, the Burger Court began to
narrow the scope of the writ of habeas corpus and the extent to which a state prisoner has
access to the federal courts for review of his federal constitutional rights. See Michael, The
"New"Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Pro-
ceedings, 64 IowA L. REV. 233 (1979); WHITEBREAD, supra note 14, at 574. The current
federal habeas corpus statutes pertaining to state prisoners are located in §§ 2241-2254 of
Title 28 of thd United States Code. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1976).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2242 (1976). A prior denial by the Supreme Court of the capital
defendant's petition for the writ of certiorari does not preclude a federal court from hearing
the same claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
189-91 (1972). Moreover, a decision by an equally divided Supreme Court does not preclude
the defendant from raising the same claims in an application for federal habeas corpus. Id.
at 192. A Supreme Court decision on the merits or a dismissal for want of a federal question,
however, prohibits all federal courts from subsequently considering the defendant's claims
in habeas corpus proceedings unless the defendant produces new evidence which he could
not have by due diligence presented earlier to the Supreme Court. See Faulk v. Mabry, 600
F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1979) (federal courts need not entertain petitions for habeas corpus
after Supreme Court dismisses appeal for want of substantial federal question);'28 U.S.C. §
2244(c) (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976).
" Section 2254(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code requires the state criminal
defendant to exhaust his state remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus, unless he can
show such remedies are no longer available or would be inadequate. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(1976). See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963) (exhaustion requirement applied only to
state remedies available at time state prisoner seeks habeas corpus relief); Relieving
Habeas Corpus, supra note 61, at 397-99.
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of judicial proceedings," and is not presenting claims the Supreme
Court has excluded from habeas corpus review. 9 Under certain cir-
cumstances, the district court will go outside of the written record of
the case and hold an evidentiary hearing to gather additional facts." If
after review of the case, the district court denies habeas corpus relief,
the capital defendant may appeal only if he obtains a certificate of
probable cause either from the district court judge who denied his
petition for habeas corpus or from a federal circuit court judge for the
circuit in which the trial occurred.7' Finally, if the district and circuit
judges refuse to issue the certificate of probable cause, or if the
federal circuit court denies habeas corpus after reviewing the case, the
capital defendant can make his final application for the writ of cer-
tiorari to the United States Supreme Court.72 Assuming the Supreme
Court again denies certiorari, and the capital defendant fails to per-
suade a lower federal court to consider a subsequent application for
habeas corpus,73 the capital defendant will have exhausted his appeal
I See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-91 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536, 539-42 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976). These cases have
substantially narrowed the deliberate by-pass rule announced in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
438-39 (1963). Under Fay, a state defendant could raise in federal habeas corpus proceedings
a constitutional claim he had not raised in state courts as long as he had not intentionally by-
passed the state courts. Id. In Wainwright, the Court explicitly narrowed the Fay rule. 433
U.S. at 87. The Wainwright Court held that if the defendant fails to comply with the state's
contemporaneous objection rule, he has waived the right to raise that claim in federal
habeas corpus proceedings unless he can show cause for failure to object and actual pre-
judice. Id. at 89-90. In Wainwright, the Court refused to give cause and prejudice precise
definitions. Id. at 90-91; see Relieving Habeas Corpus, supra note 61, at 406-09 (discussion of
the Wainwright, Francis, and Estelle decisions); WHITEBREAD, supra note 14, at 582-85
(same).
6 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 (1976). In Stone, the Supreme Court held that
federal courts should not review alleged violations of fourth amendment rights in habeas
corpus proceedings if the state court had provided an opportunity for a full and fair hearing
on the issues. Id. But see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979) (federal courts should
review insufficiency of evidence claims in habeas corpus proceedings despite opportunity
for full and fair hearing in state courts); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560-64 (1979) (federal
courts should review in habeas corpus proceedings defendant's claim of racial discrimination
in grand jury selection process because state judiciary unlikely to give opportunity for full
and fair hearing).
70 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976). Section 2254(d) of Title 28 of the United States Code
requires a federal court in habeas corpus proceedings to presume that the state court's fac-
tual determinations are correct, unless certain statutory circumstances exist. Id. If a federal
court makes independent findings of fact contrary to the state court's determinations, the
federal court must in writing indicate which of the statutory circumstances of § 2254(d) war-
ranted an independent federal evidentiary review. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551-52
(1981).
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
71 See Robinson, supra note 50, at 488.
" Section 2244(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code limits the prisoner's ability to
file successive petitions for habeas corpus in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1976). If a
defendant bases his second petition on new facts or issues, the court will require a showing
that the defendant did not deliberately withhold these matters in the earlier petition. Id.
Although not explicitly stated in § 2244(b), the federal judge does have the discretion to
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options in the federal system. The state then may administer the death
penalty."
The present system of judicial review of death penalty cases has two
major defects. First, the system is repetitive and prone to delay.7" The
delay not only prevents the states from administering their death penalty
statutes in a timely fashion, but it also unjustifiably subjects capital
defendants possessing valid constitutional claims to an uncertain and
lengthy death row existence. Second, the present system of judicial
hear a second petition solely because the ends of justice require it. See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1963).
1' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.06 (West 1972). The appeal of John Spenkelink
graphically illustrates the current appeal process in death penalty cases. Spenkelink is the
only person who vigorously pursued all his appeal options to be executed in the United
States since the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1976.
See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 951 n.5 (1981). A Florida trial court found Spenkelink
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to death in 1973. See Spenkelink v. State,
313 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1975). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed both the sentence and
punishment in early 1975. Id. at 671. After a 17 month delay in which the United States
Supreme Court considered, and then upheld, the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty
statute in Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976), the Court denied Spenkelink's cer-
tiorari petition. See Spenkelink v. Florida, 428 U.S. 911 (1976). Over the next 16 months,
Spenkelink unsuccessfully applied for executive clemency, initiated post-conviction pro-
ceedings in the court that convicted him, appealed the trial court decision to the Florida
Supreme Court, and unsuccessfully sought the writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court. See Spenkeink v. State, 350 So.2d 85 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960
(1977).
In September, 1977, Spenkelink initiated federal habeas corpus proceedings in a
Florida district court. See Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). The district court stayed Spenkelink's execution and granted an
evidentiary hearing before subsequently denying to issue the writ. 578 F.2d at 589.
Spenkelink unsuccessfully appealed the district court decision to the Fifth Circuit. Id. The
Supreme Court in March 1979 denied Spenkelink's third petition for certiorari. 440 U.S. at
976.
Over the next two months, Spenkelink again unsuccessfully sought executive clemency
from Florida's governor, the writ of habeas corpus from a Florida district court and the
Fifth Circuit, and a stay of execution from Justice Rehnquist. See Spenkelink v. Wain-
wright, 442 U.S. 1301 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). On May 25, 1979, after six years
and fourteen state and federal reviews of his case, the state of Florida executed John
Spenkelink. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. at 951 n.5.
I See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-58 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Nakell, supra note 47, at 473-76; Bodine, supra note 9, at 22. The criticisms of duplication
and excessive delay are not unique to death penalty cases, but apply to appellate
review of state criminal cases in general. See Cameron, National Court of State Appeal.:'A
View from the States, 65 A.B.A.J. 709, 710-1-1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Cameron];
Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841, 842
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Haynsworth]; Handling Criminal Cases, supra note 50, at 602;
Stolz, supra note 50, at 964; J. Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions,
and a Proposalfor a National Court of Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a Continuing
Problem 17-21 (1981) (unpublished dissertation, University of Virginia School of Law)
[hereinafter cited as National Court].
"' See Estelle v. Jurek, 450 U.S. 1014 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussion of
death penalty case in which defendant spent eight years on death row before winning new
trial in federal habeas corpus proceedings); Johnson, Warehousing for Death, 26 CRIME AND
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review discourages the development of clear constitutional guidelines
for the states to follow in administering their death penalty laws." The
Supreme Court, because of its caseload, is simply unable to hear the
number of capital cases necessary to provide the states clear constitu-
tional standards to follow. 8 Moreover, the numerous federal district and
circuit courts must resolve the constitutional issues presented in death
penalty cases, since the Supreme Court already will have denied cer-
tiorari in these cases on two occasions.19 These multiple forums cannot
provide the same consistent application of the Constitution that a single
federal court would provide. 0
Concern over the defects in the present system of judicial review of
state criminal cases has led to numerous proposals for reform in the last
few years.8 Among the most appealing of these proposals is one first put
forward in 1973 by Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., Chief Judge of
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 Judge Haynsworth proposed that
Congress create a new national court of criminal appeals with jurisdic-
tion to review by writ of certiorari the federal questions arising in all
state and federal criminal cases.8 Under Judge Haynsworth's proposal,
state criminal defendants could petition the national court of criminal ap-
peals for a writ of certiorari on direct appeal from their state's highest
appeals court. 4 In addition, state criminal defendants who subsequently
raised new federal questions in state post-conviction proceedings could
submit one post-conviction petition for certiorari to the national appeals
court.8" On either direct or post-conviction appeal, the national court
would deny certiorari only in cases where the criminal defendant failed
DELINQUENCY 545 (1980) (discussion of problems condemned prisoners face living on death
row); Note, Mental Suffering under Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
57 IOWA L. REv. 814, 826-31 (1972) (same).
"7 See text accompanaying note 29 supra.
"' See note 14 supra (discussion of Supreme Court's caseload and Court's inability to
hear more capital cases). At least one commentator argues that the Supreme Court, because
of its workload, no longer provides adequate guidelines in all areas of the law, both criminal
and civil. See Griswold, supra note 14, at 335-50.
" See text accompanying notes 64-74 supra.
" See Cameron, supra note 75, at 710-11; National Court, supra note 75, at 21-23; CARR-
INGTON, supra note 50, at 209. Justice Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court points out
that not only do the various federal circuit courts apply the United States Constitution dif-
ferently when reviewing state criminal cases on habeas corpus review, but various panels of
the same federal circuit court, and the numerous federal district judges, also apply the Con-
stitution inconsistently. See Cameron, supra note 75, at 711. The multiplicity of federal
forums creates confusion rather than clarity and leaves state courts uncertain as to what
the Constitution requires in criminal cases. Id.
" See notes 50 & 75 supra.





to present a substantial federal question.86 Once the court had heard a
prisoner's claim, or had denied certiorari for failure to present a substan-
tial federal question, no federal court other than the Supreme Court
could reconsider the claim. 7
Under the Haynsworth proposal, the state criminal defendant could
obtain review of his case by the Supreme Court in one of three ways.
First, if the national court of criminal appeals decided the defendant's
claims on the merits, the defendant then could petition the Supreme
Court for certiorari. Second, if the national court denied certiorari to a
defendant for failing to present a substantial federal question and at
least one judge objected to the denial of certiorari, the defendant also
could petition the Supreme Court for certiorari.89 Third, after a denial of
certiorari by a unanimous national court, the Supreme Court, on its own
motion, could issue the writ of certiorari to the national court or the
state court of origin if the Supreme Court felt the defendant's constitu-
tional claims warranted further consideration."
Judge Haynsworth would permit the lower federal courts to con-
tinue hearing petitions for the writ of habeas corpus, but only when the
defendant could demonstrate two facts.9' The defendant must show that
a state procedural rule now prevents him from raising his constitutional
challenge in the state courts.2 In addition, the defendant must show that
he did not deliberately by-pass an opportunity to present his constitu-
tional claims in an earlier court proceeding. 3
The Haynsworth proposal would alleviate one problem confronting
" See Handling Criminal Cases, supra note 50, at 604 n.28.
" Id. at 606.
" See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at 843.
" Id. In his proposal for a national criminal appeals court, Judge Haynsworth sug-
gested that if the national court unanimously voted to deny certiorari to a criminal defen-
dant, the Supreme Court should not subsequently have to entertain the defendant's peti-
tion. Id. Judge Haynsworth justified this policy on the grounds that in most cases the defen-
dant's petition will not contain meritorious claims worthy of Supreme Couit review. Id.
" Id. Judge Haynsworth would allow the Supreme Court on its own motion to grant
certiorari to a criminal defendant in two circumstances. First, the national court might occa-
sionally unanimously dismiss a petition for certiorari that contained meritorious federal
claims. Id. Judge Haynsworth proposed that the Supreme Court add a small staff for the
purpose of monitoring the national court's unanimous denials of certiorari to insure that
criminal defendants who have substantial federal claims to present do get federal review of
their claims. Id. Second, Judge Haynsworth noted that occasionally the national court might
dismiss a defendant's claims based on settled federal law that the Supreme Court would
now like to reconsider. Id. The Supreme Court could, under the Haynsworth's proposal,
take up the case on its own motion and resolve the issues involved. Id.
11 Id. at 843-44.
92 Id.
,1 Id. Judge Haynsworth adopted the deliberate by-pass rule announced in Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963), for determining when a state defendant can raise a claim in
federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at 843.
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the states in death penalty cases by providing a prompt and thorough
review of the capital defendant's constitutional claims." The national
court would hear all the constitutional claims the capital defendant raised
on direct appeal soon after the state's highest appeals court considered
the case. A decision by the national court adverse to the capital defen-
dant would preclude the defendant from thereafter raising the same
claims in any federal forum other than the Supreme Court. 5 In those
cases where a capital defendant had additional constitutional claims to
raise in state post-conviction proceedings, the national court would pro-
vide the same prompt review. Furthermore, the national court would
greatly reduce, if not practically eliminate, the need for habeas corpus
proceedings by providing the capital defendant a single federal forum in
which to raise his constitutional claims early in the appeal process.97 Con-
sequently, the capital defendant with valid constitutional claims would
spend less time living an uncertain existence on death row. 8 Conversely,
if the capital defendant had no valid constitutional claims, the national
court's prompt disposition of the case would permit the state to impose
the death penalty in an expeditious manner.99
The national court proposed by Judge Haynsworth would also con-
tribute to the development of clear constitutional standards for the
states to follow in administering their death penalty laws. As a single
court of review with the capacity to hear all death penalty cases coming
from the states, the national court would provide a more uniform ap-
plication of the Constitution than is now possible in the current multi-
court review process.' 9 The states would receive prompt and regular
feedback on those features of their death penalty laws that do not pro-
vide capital defendants the "super due process" protections the Consti-
tution requires. 1 ' The states presumably would translate the feedback
from the national court into constitutionally appropriate procedures for
capital trials and the possibility of constitutional error occurring at trial
would diminish. Consequently, the states would be less likely to
sentence people to death in an unconstitutional manner. Moreover, the
" See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at 844. Judge Haynsworth identified prompt resolu-
tion of a state criminal defendant's constitutional claims as the major reason for creating the
national court. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
'6 See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
See Handling Criminal Cases, supra note 50, at 606; text accompanying notes 91-93
supra.
9 See text accompanying note 76 supra.
See note 9 supra (discussion of reasons for prompt disposition of death penalty
cases).
10 See Cameron, supra note 75, at 712. Justice Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court
has observed that once a national court began applying the United States Constitution in a
uniform manner to state criminal cases, state courts could apply the Constitution in subse-
quent cases in a similarly consistent manner. Id. at 711.
11 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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national court would encourage the uniform development of constitu-
tional law as capital defendants raise new or previously unresolved
issues on appeal. °2
The Haynsworth proposal for a new national court of criminal ap-
peals, however, is open to at least three criticisms. First, there would be
the danger that a specialized criminal appeals court would create a body
of criminal law understandable only to a specialized criminal bar and
contrary to the basic values of society." 3 Second, there would be the
danger that the President, his political party, and special interest groups
would politicize the appointment process to insure the selection, of
judges with a common hard-line or soft-line philosophy regarding crime
and punishment issues.' 04 Third, there would be the problem that the
President would be unable to attract qualified judges to sit on a court
that many people would perceive to lack the prestige of a federal appeals
court of general jurisdiction.'
0 5
Recently, Justice James Duke Cameron of the Arizona Supreme
Court has offered a modified version of the Haynsworth proposal which
See People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 188-96, 599 P.2d 587, 615-20, 158 Cal. Rptr.
281, 308-13 (1979) (Mosk, J., concurring) (discussion of numerous unresolved constitutional
issues in death penalty cases). Judge Haynsworth has predicted that his proposed national
court could produce clear constitutional principles for the states to follow in death penalty
cases within a reasonably short period of time. Telephone interview with Judge Clement F.
Haynsworth, Jr., Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (Sept. 17, 1981)
(transcript on file in law review office).
103 See CARRINGTON, supra note 50, at 168. Judge Haynsworth acknowledged in his
original proposal for a national criminal appeals court that many people opposed a specializ-
ed criminal court. See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at 845. Judge Haynsworth, however,
argued that the provisions he proposed for Supreme Court review would prevent the na-
tional court from going off on "erratic tangents of its own." Id. See also text accompanying
notes 88-90 supra (discussion of Haynesworth's provisions for Supreme Court review).
I0 See CARRINGTON, supra note 50, at 168; Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1306 (1974); Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 634, 639 (1974). Judge Haynsworth in his original proposal for a national
criminal appeals court suggested that the President should nominate the judges to sit on
the new court and the Senate confirm the nominations. See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at
845. Judge Haynsworth argued that this selection process would preclude the appointment
of judges with narrow ideological viewpoints to the court. Id. In a subsequent article on the
national court proposal, Judge Haynsworth acknowledged that many people were concern-
ed that the Haynsworth proposal would result in an overly politicized selection process and
an ideologically biased court. See Handling Criminal Cases, supra note 50, at 614-15. Judge
Haynsworth, however, re-emphasized his earlier position that Senate confirmation would
provide adequate safeguards. Id. In spite of Judge Haynsworth's assurances, the politiciza-
tion and polarization problems continue to have a "chilling effect" on the Haynsworth pro-
posal. See Cameron, supra note 75, at 712.
,0 See CARRINGTON, supra note 50, at 168. Judge Haynsworth stressed in his original
proposal that although the court would have jurisdiction to hear only criminal cases, the op-
portunity to participate in the fashioning of uniform constitutional standards in the criminal
area would attract qualified judges. See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at 842. As an added in-
centive, however, Judge Haynsworth proposed that the members of the national court hold
the title of justice and receive a salary greater than that paid federal circuit judges. Id.
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avoids the criticisms mentioned above."6 Justice Cameron proposes the
creation of a national court of state appeals rather than a national court
of criminal appeals. 1' The proposed court would have exclusive original
jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari all federal questions arising in
state criminal and civil litigation.' ° The national court would not review,
as Judge Haynsworth originally proposed, federal criminal cases.' 9
Since Justice Cameron's court would hear both criminal and civil cases,
there would be minimal danger that the court would become a specialized
criminal court."0 Additionally, the proposed court would eliminate the
danger of politicization because its general jurisdiction would concen-
trate on no single issue."' Lastly, since the national court would have
general jurisdiction to review all state court determinations of federal
law, there would be no problem attracting qualified judges."' Judge
Haynsworth recently endorsed the jurisdictional modification proposed
by Justice Cameron and observed that the national court of state ap-
peals would provide a prompt and uniform application of federal con-
stitutional principles to state death penalty cases."
3
There are, however, two unsatisfactory features of the Cameron pro-
posal that should not be incorporated into a modified Haynsworth pro-
posal. These features would prevent some capital defendants from get-
ting as thorough a federal review of their constitutional claims as the
present system provides. First, the Cameron proposal would give the na-
tional court complete discretionary jurisdiction."' Since Justice
Cameron predicts that the caseload of the national court would be quite
heavy,"' there is the possibility that the national court would soon begin
"' See Cameron, supra note 75, at 711; National Court, supra note 75, at 26-27; text ac-
companying notes 103-05 supra.
10? See Cameron, supra note 75, at 711.
108 Id.
" See text accompanying note 83 supra.
110 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
11 See text accompanying note 104 supra. In his proposal for a national court, Justice
Cameron calls for the President to nominate and the Senate to confirm the members of the
national court. See Cameron, supra note 75, at 712. Justice Cameron also proposes that the
President, in selecting his nominees, employ the same merit review process that is now
used to select federal circuit judges to avoid the prospect that the selection process
becomes overly politicized. Id.
11 See text accompanying note 105 supra; Cameron, supra note 75, at 712. Justice
Cameron asserted that a court with general jurisdiction to hear state cases like he proposed
would be more able to attract qualified judges than would the specialized criminal court pro-
posed'by Judge Haynsworth. Id.
113 Letter from Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.,.Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals'(Sept. 22, 1981 (copy on file in law review office).
..4 See Cameron, supra note 75, at 711. The Cameron national court proposal places no
restrictions on the national court's capacity to deny certiorari to a state defendant. Id.
11 See National Court, supra note 75, at 41. Based on statistics compiled by the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts, Justice Cameron predicted that the annual
caseload of the new court would consist of approximately 500 civil cases and 3000 criminal
cases. Id. The national court's caseload would be slightly less than the Supreme Court's
annual caseload. See note 14 supra.
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denying certiorari in death penalty cases as frequently as the Supreme
Court currently does.11 Under the Cameron proposal, the lower federal
courts would lose their jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions117 and
could no longer provide the federal review they now do subsequent to a
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court."8 Furthermore, under the
Cameron proposal a denial of certiorari by a unanimous national court
would preclude the capital defendant from thereafter petitioning the
Supreme Court for certiorari.119 The effect of these provisions would be
to limit some capital defendants to considerably less federal review of
their claims than they would receive under the present system. In con-
trast, the Haynsworth proposal would not so limit the capital defendant's
access to federal appellate review. The Haynsworth proposal would
restrict the national court's capacity to deny certiorari by requiring the
court to determine first that the defendant's certiorari petition contains
no substantial federal claims. 2 ' Requiring the national court to consider
the substance of the capital defendant's claims should not overly burden
the national court's caseload and would insure that the capital defendant
received more than a cursory federal review of his constitutional claims.
Furthermore, the Haynsworth proposal would allow the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari on its own motion after a unanimous denial of'cer-
tiorari by the national court. 1 ' This provision provides, an additional
safeguard that the capital defendant's constitutional claims would be
reviewed adequately.
The second unsatisfactory feature of the Cameron proposal concerns
the limits placed on Supreme Court review of national court decisions.
Under the Cameron proposal, a unanimous decision on the merits by the
national court that is adverse to the defendant cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court." This limitation on Supreme Court review is quite
different from the present system of federal appellate review whereby a
capital defendant can petition the Supreme Court for certiorari after a
federal circuit court has denied habeas corpus relief by either a
unanimous or majority opinion. ' In contrast to the Cameron proposal,
the Haynsworth proposal allows the capital defendant to petition the
Supreme Court after the national court issues either a unanimous or ma-
jority opinion adverse to the defendant." The Haynsworth proposal
116 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
"T See National Court, supra note 75, at 46.
"' See text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
" See Cameron, supra note 75, at 712.
"2 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
I See text accompanying note 90 supra.
1' See Cameron, supra note 75, at 712.
I See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1976). Section 1254(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code
provides the Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction to review decisions by the federal
courts of appeals. Id. Section 1254(1) does not distinguish between unanimous and majority
court of appeals decisions. Id.
"' See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at 843. In discussion of the Haynsworth proposal,
Justice Cameron incorrectly states that Judge Haynsworth would preclude a capital defen-
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would insure that the national court could not insulate its unanimous
decisions in death penalty cases from subsequent Supreme Court re-
view. The task of reviewing approximately ninety certiorari petitions filed
annually by capital defendants on appeal from the national court would
not add to the Supreme Court's current workload"' and would insure
that the Supreme Court remains supreme. 2 '
A national court for state appeals based on the Haynsworth pro-
posal12 7 with the Cameron jurisdictional modification 12 8 would do much to
eliminate the constitutional stalemate that now exists in death penalty
cases." Capital defendants would receive a prompt and thorough review
of their constitutional claims."10 Moreover, the states would receive ade-
quate constitutional guidelines as the national court applied the Con-
stitution uniformly to all death penalty cases. 3' As a result, the states
could maximize the deterrent and -retributive purposes of the death
penalty by promptly imposing the punishment on cap'ital defendants who




dant from petitioning the Supreme Court after a unanimous adverse decision on the merits
by the national court. See Cameron, supra note 75, at 712. Judge Haynsworth, however, was
referring to a unanimous denial of certiorari by the national court and not a unanimous deci-
sion on the merits. See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at 843.
125 See note 14 supra.
' See Haynsworth, supra note 75, at 843. In his proposal for a national court, Judge
Haynsworth stressed that the "overlordship" of the Supreme Court would be preserved
under his proposal. Id.
12 See text accompanying notes 82-93 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 106-113 supra.
125 See text accompanying notes 1-9 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 94-99 supra. The time required for a state capital
defendant to have all his constitutional claims reviewed by the national court could be
shortened considerably if the states implemented a unified appeals procedure similar to the
one recently adopted in Georgia. See Georgia Unified Appeal Procedure, GA. CODE ANN. §
27-2538 (1977 and Supp. 1981). The Georgia procedure is specifically designed for trial
courts to use in death penalty cases. Id. The purpose of the procedure is to encourage the
capital defendant to raise all of his constitutional challenges at the trial level so that these
challenges will be reviewed by state and federal appellate courts on direct appeal. Id. The
Georgia procedure requires the trial court to confer regularly with the prosecutor, defense
counsel, and defendant at every stage of the criminal proceedings and during these con-
ferences make use of an elaborate constitutional law checklist. Id. This checklist identifies
most constitutional errors that can occur prior to, during, and after trial in death penalty
cases. Id. The procedure is designed not only to prevent constitutional errors from occur-
ring, but also to insure that the defendant either raises all his constitutional claims in the
first instance or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives the claims. Id. The Georgia
procedure, by encouraging the capital defendant to raise his claims at the trial level, should
greatly reduce if not eliminate the need for a subsequent post-conviction appeal. A federal
judge has recently praised the Georgia unified appeals procedure. See Westbrook v. Zant,
515 F. Supp. 1347, 1348 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (Georgia's onetime, quicker appeal procedure is good
news for future).
131 See text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
1 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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